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the brain constructs representations of what is sensed and thought about in the form of nerve 
impulses  that  propagate  in  circuits  and  network  assemblies  (circuit  impulse  Patterns,  ciPs). 
ciP representations of which humans are consciously aware occur in the context of a sense 
of  self. thus,  research  on  mechanisms  of  consciousness  might  benefit  from  a  focus  on  how 
a conscious sense of self is represented in brain. like all senses, the sense of self must be con-
tained in patterns of nerve impulses. Unlike the traditional senses that are registered by im-
pulse flow in relatively simple, pauci-synaptic projection pathways, the sense of self is a sys-
tem-level  phenomenon  that  may  be  generated  by  impulse  patterns  in  widely  distributed 
complex and interacting circuits. the problem for researchers then is to identify the ciPs that 
are  unique  to  conscious  experience.  Also  likely  to  be  of  great  relevance  to  constructing  the 
representation of self are the coherence shifts in activity timing relations among the circuits.
consider  that  an  embodied  sense  of  self  is  generated  and  contained  as  unique  com-
binatorial  temporal  patterns  across  multiple  neurons  in  each  circuit  that  contrib-
utes  to  constructing  the  sense  of  self.  As  with  other  kinds  of  ciPs,  those  represent-
ing  the  sense  of  self  can  be  learned  from  experience,  stored  in  memory,  modified  by 
subsequent experiences, and expressed in the form of decisions, choices, and commands. these 
ciPs are proposed here to be the actual physical basis for conscious thought and the sense of self. 
when active in wakefulness or dream states, the ciP representations of self act as an agent 
of  the  brain,  metaphorically  as  an  avatar.  Because  the  selfhood  ciP  patterns  may  only 
have  to    represent  the  self  and  not  directly  represent  the  inner  and  outer  worlds  of  em-
bodied  brain,  the  self  representation  should  have  more  degrees  of  freedom  than  sub-
conscious  mind  and  may  therefore  have  some  capacity  for  a  free-will  mind  of  its  own. 
several lines of evidence for this theory are reviewed. suggested new research includes identifying 
distinct combinatorially coded impulse patterns and their temporal coherence shifts  in defined 
circuitry, such as neocortical microcolumns. this task might be facilitated by identifying the micro-
topography of field-potential oscillatory coherences among various regions and between different 
frequencies associated with specific conscious mentation. other approaches can include identifying 
the changes in discrete conscious operations produced by focal trans-cranial magnetic stimulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Theories for conscious mind range from bizarre to prosaic. Bizarre 
theories include spiritualistic ideas in which mind is imposed on brain 
from the outside, as if the brain were some sort of antenna (Nunez, 
2010). But even traditional science could yield such theories: a case in 
point is the theory that quantum mechanics entanglement might influ-
ence mind at a distance (Stapp, 2007). Other possible explanations for 
consciousness might be imagined based on string theory, dark matter, 
or dark energy if the nature of these new discoveries were understood. 
The more popular theories include those based on Bayesian prob-
ability (Tolman, 1932; cf. Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2007),  or chaos 
theory (Izhikevich, 2007; Freeman, 2009). These ideas when applied as 
explanations for consciousness tend to be more metaphor than mecha-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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nism. Chaos and Bayesian ideas seem to provide fascinating descrip-
tions, but seem lacking in explanatory power. To understand mind, we 
may ultimately be forced to invoke mathematical models, subatomic 
physics, or science that doesn’t exist yet. But we don’t have to invoke 
some kind of “ghost in the machine” to understand consciousness. 
To understand conscious mind we have to understand the other 
aspects of brain function: non-conscious functions such as spinal and 
brainstem reflexes and neuroendocrine control. Fortunately, we know 
a great deal about non-conscious neural machinery that ought to be 
applicable for explaining conscious mind. Common sense, as well as 
a great deal of neuroscientific evidence, indicates that the conscious 
mind emerges from the same place that houses non-conscious and 
subconscious minds: circuits in the brain.
Theories of consciousness mechanisms have perhaps been hindered 
by vagueness. A more tangible way to think about consciousness is to 
regard it as sixth sense, the sense of self. Thus, like all senses the sense 
of self must have a neural representation based on patterns of nerve im-
pulses. Consider that an embodied sense of self is generated and con-
tained as unique combinatorial patterns across multiple neurons in the 
same circuit. As with other kinds of Circuit Impulse Patterns (CIPs), 
those representing the sense of self can be learned from experience, 
stored in memory, modified by subsequent experiences, and expressed 
in the form of decisions, choices, and commands. These CIPs could be 
the actual physical basis for conscious thought and the sense of self. 
The question of where to look for sense-of-self CIPs should begin 
with recognizing the areas of brain that are necessary and sufficient for 
conscious awareness in the context of self. These areas are well known 
and constitute what I call the consciousness system.
The CONsCIOUsNess sysTem
The seminal and well-established work in cats of the 50s by Morruzzi, 
Magoun, and others (reviewed  in Klemm & Vertes, 1990) established 
that consciousness depends on an “ascending reticular arousal system” 
(ARAS) in the brainstem that activates the neocortex to generate con-
sciousness. The ARAS receives direct activating collateral input from all 
traditional senses (except olfaction) and in turn activates the neocortex 
to produce alert wakefulness. Part of this ascending activating path-
way also includes the rostral extension of brainstem reticular neurons 
that surround the main body of the thalamus. Electrical stimulation 
of the reticular thalamus evokes the characteristic signs of conscious-
ness, namely, field-potential gamma waves in widespread areas of the 
neocortex (MacDonald, Fifkova, Jones, & Barth, 1998). Yet another 
component is the intra-laminar portion of the thalamus, neurons of 
which have characteristic impulse firing patterns during wakefulness 
(Steriade & Glenn, 1982). During transitions to wakefulness, intra-
laminar thalamic neurons exhibit marked increases in firing, which 
lag the initial increase in brainstem and basal forebrain cholinergic 
neurons. Thus, it may be that while brainstem neurons trigger con-
sciousness, intra-laminar thalamic neurons may be needed to sustain it 
and regulate attention shifts (reviewed by Schiff, 2008). In non-human 
primates, shifts in attention correlate with field potential oscillations 
in  intra-laminar  thalamus  of  20-80  Hz  (Fries,  Reynolds,  Rorie,  & 
Desimone, 2001; Murthy & Fetz, 1996; Peseran, Pezaris,  Sahani, Mitra, 
& Andersen, 2002). Oscillations in this high-frequency range in the 
neocortex are well-known characteristics of consciousness.
In addition to the well-known projections from neocortex back 
into the brainstem reticular area, there are also cortico-fugal projec-
tions  into  the  intra-laminar  thalamus.  Collectively,  these  intercon-
nected  brain  areas  constitute  what  could  be  called  a  consciousness 
system (Figure 1).
Steriade  and  McCarley  (2005)  vowed  to  “resurrect”  the  classic 
Moruzzi/Magoun studies “from unjustified oblivion.” The often-forgot-
ten consensus is that the ARAS responds to sensory input and creates 
a cascade of ascending excitatory influences that eventually trigger the 
cortex into wakefulness and consciousness. The brainstem reticulum 
integrates converging signals from the viscera, internal milieu, and the 
bodily senses. It also contains circuitry that regulates vital functions of 
the heart and respiratory system, sleep and wakefulness cycles, arousal, 
attention, and the emotions (reviewed by Klemm & Vertes, 1990). 
Consciousness arises when the outer mantle of brain, the neocortex, 
is activated (or disinhibited) by influences from the brainstem reticular 
formation and its rostral extension, the reticular thalamus (Yingling & 
Skinner, 1977). 
But showing which parts of brain constitute a consciousness system 
does not explain much. It merely shows where conscious mind comes 
from and how it might be triggered and sustained. This present review 
will focus on how consciousness, once triggered, might be produced 
and sustained.
Neocortex
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Reticulum
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Forebrain
Thalamus
The "Consciousness System
Figure 1.
Author’s concept of consciousness as a system function of spe-
cific areas of brain.
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NeOCORTex as The seaT                             
Of CONsCIOUsNess
While the neocortex is only one part of the consciousness system, it 
is the most crucial part. Focal lesions, as in cardiovascular stroke, for 
example, produce specific deficiencies in conscious operations. The 
brainstem and thalamic components of the consciousness system lack 
the complex network architecture of the neocortex and thus are not 
likely to do more than limited conscious processing. But the brainstem 
reticulum is crucial to consciousness, for without the cortical drive it 
produces, there is permanent coma.
CORTICal aRChITeCTURe
Microscopic examination of the neocortex shows that all parts of it 
have a similar columnar architecture (Douglas & Martin, 2004; see 
Figure 2). Cortical columns, at their most basic structural level, have 
their constituent neurons oriented perpendicular to the surface, with 
its neurons “hard wired” to form a miniature network assembly, typi-
cally referred to as a minicolumn. Such a small assembly is not likely to 
have much direct impact on conscious operations, but when columns 
act in the aggregate much more sophisticated operations become pos-
sible. Several adjacent minicolumns form functional aggregates, called 
macrocolumns. About a thousand minicolumns aggregate into a mac-
rocolumn. Macrocolumns have a size of a few millimeters. 
The explanation of columns just given is the common view, but it 
is simplistic. A recent review by daCosta and Martin (2010) points out 
that no one has actually seen columns as such. They suggest it is prob-
ably more correct and useful to think of cortical columns as “canonical 
microcircuits.” The idea is that columns are microcircuits repeatedly 
stacked adjacent to each other, and their intimate cross connections 
produce the collective emergent functions of cerebral cortex. No one 
microcircuit stands alone but rather contains only some of the at-
tributes of the whole cortical apparatus. Functions of the canonical 
microcircuit are dynamic, changing frequently in terms of the subset 
of neurons that are currently active.
The general assumption is that column activity oscillates at differ-
ent frequencies. The important function is the interplay of columns 
that is governed by shifting degrees of oscillatory synchrony (Freeman, 
2007). But let us not lose sight of the fact that the oscillations are caused 
by CIPs.
Another detail about this circuitry that is not shown in the diagram 
is that the layer 2 and 3 cells (L2 and L3 cells) get different kinds of 
input at different levels of their dendrites and cell body. L2 and L3 cells 
are large pyramidal cells that receive input at different points of their 
dendritic arborization from three different types of nearby inhibitory 
cells (reviewed by Jones, 2000). Thus the same cell, and by extension 
the circuits with which it is associated, can simultaneously contribute 
to different representations. One representation might be for a specific 
sensory input, while another might contribute to the representation of 
the sense of self, thus enabling the conscious sense that it is “I” who 
sees, hears, and so on.
This idea of impulse patterns as representations is crucial to the 
thesis herein. Consider how traditional sensory stimuli are registered 
in the brain. We know from monitoring known anatomical pathways 
for specific sensations that sensory organs and the brain abstract ele-
ments of the outside world and create a representation with CIPs. As 
long as the CIPs remain active in real time, the sensation is intact, 
Figure 2.
simplified  diagram  of  the  excitatory  neurons  in  any  given 
cortical column (Area A) of the human neocortex and the in-
terconnections with other columns (Area B). the vertical layer 
location of neurons is indicated by l3, l4, etc. shown are in-
put sources from subthalamus (sub) and thalamus (thal). the 
nodes  of  the  graph  are  organized  approximately  spatially; 
vertical corresponds to the layers of cortex, and horizontal to 
its lateral extent. Arrows indicate the direction of excitatory 
action. thick edges indicate the relations between excitatory 
neurons in a local patch of neocortex. thin edges indicate ex-
citatory connections to and from subcortical structures, and 
inter-areal connections. each node is labeled for its cell type. 
For cortical cells, lx refers to the layer in which its cell body 
is located, P indicates that it is an excitatory neuron. thal = 
thalamus and sub =  other subcortical structures, such as the 
basal ganglia. not shown are the inhibitory neurons and the 
modulating brainstem inputs, such as noradrenergic neurons 
in the locus coeruleus, serotonergic neurons in the raphe nu-
clei, dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area, and 
the energizing cholinergic neurons in the nucleus basalis. top 
of diagram is the outer surface of cortex, while bottom of dia-
gram shows the deepest layers of cells. Adapted from “cortical 
Architecture,” by t. Binzegger, r. J. douglas, and A. c. Martin, 
in M. de gregorio, v. di Mayo, M. Frucci, & c. Mucio (eds.), BVAI 
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and may even be accessible to consciousness. However, if something 
disrupts ongoing CIPs to create a different set of CIPs, as for example 
would happen with a different stimulus, then the original representa-
tion disappears and may be lost. Of course, the original CIPs may have 
been sustained long enough to have been consolidated in memory, 
in which case retrieval back into active working memory would pre-
sumably  reconstruct  a  similar    CIP  representation  of  the  original 
stimulus.
We can infer that impulse firing in distributed neocortical circuits 
is a representation of a perceived stimulus or conscious thought from 
extension of the classical studies of Hubel and Wiesel (e.g., 1959, 1962). 
They established that visual images are deconstructed into fragments, 
with each fragment being represented by impulse discharge of specific 
neurons. Large numbers of these feature-selective neurons are scattered 
throughout the visual cortex, each representing its own particular frag-
mented representation of the over-all image. Such observations have 
raised the enigma of explaining how all these fragmentary CIP rep-
resentations are coordinated to reconstruct a conscious percept in the 
“mind’s eye.” This is now famously referred to as the binding problem. 
Of course, the requirement for binding diverse sensory and cognitive 
processes extends to numerous brain functions besides vision.
The rich interconnections of various neocortical areas provide a 
way for the whole complex, once triggered from the brainstem, to oper-
ate as one conscious processing system. Note that primary neocortical 
input comes from the thalamus, terminating in layer 4 (Jones, 1998). 
Numerous feedback loops are evident. This anatomical substrate for 
recurrent activity no doubt is a major source of neocortical  oscillations 
of various frequencies (reviewed by Buzsáki, 2006, and Steriade, 2006).
Such organization shows that cortical columns can be mutual regu-
lators. Clusters of adjacent columns can stabilize and become basins of 
oscillating attraction, and the output to remote regions of cortex can 
facilitate synchronization with distant basins of attraction (Freeman, 
2007). Control in such a system is collective and cooperative. 
Elemental cortical circuit design includes recurrent excitatory and 
inhibitory connections within and between layers (Burkhalter, 2008). 
Most of the excitatory drive is generated by local recurrent connec-
tions within the cortical layers, and the sensory inputs from the outside 
world are relatively sparse (reviewed by Douglas & Martin, 2004). The 
usefulness of this design is that weak sensory inputs are amplified by 
local positive feedback. The risk of such organization is runaway exci-
tation and, in epilepsy, the problem emerges when a lesion removes the 
normal inhibitory influences that hold the circuitry in check (Jefferys 
& Whittington, 1996).  
Current understanding of neocortical circuitry was  discovered 
in  non-human  primates.  Though  human  neocortex  shows  similar 
anatomical layering and cells types, it is likely that there are some 
differences in inter-neuronal connectivity. Nonetheless, animal data 
make clear that neocortex has rich interconnections and capacity for 
generating multiple oscillatory frequencies with a range of synchronic-
ity possibilities. 
The amount of neocortex in humans is relatively much larger than 
in other primates. But size alone is not sufficient to explain the unique 
human  cognitive  abilities  and  level  of  consciousness  (reviewed  by 
Herculano-Houzel, 2009).
Inhibitory  circuits  are  crucial  for  controlling  oscillations  and 
time-chopping of impulse traffic, both within and among columns 
(reviewed by Buzsáki, 2006). Some 10-20% of all synapses in neocortex 
are thought to be inhibitory (reviewed in Douglas & Martin, 2004). 
We know that neocortex generates multiple-frequency oscillations and 
that oscillation can time-chop the throughput so that information flows 
best on every half cycle (reviewed by Buzsáki, 2006, p. 171). Yet no one 
has identified the temporal succession of impulse patterns for a given 
mental state, even in a single cortical column. If the impulse activity of 
multiple neurons in a given column could be recorded simultaneously, 
then we might have a way to examine the possibilities for combinato-
rial coding in a given column as it changes with mental state. That may 
be an insurmountable task, even for a single column, not to mention 
multiple columns under the same conditions. At a minimum, we could 
compare a limited set of observations from cortical  columns such as 
undefined multiple-unit activity or field potentials during sleep, an-
esthesia, alert wakefulness, and dreaming.
CIP RePReseNTaTIONs                                   
Of The CONsCIOUs seNse Of self
The currency of conscious mind is the action potential, or more pre-
cisely, the spatial and temporal patterns of impulses in distributed and 
linked microcircuits and networks (cf. Figure 3). As mentioned, some 
parts of the so-called consciousness system exhibit characteristic firing 
patterns during alert wakefulness. But all studies of impulse activity at 
various points along the consciousness system have been performed 
on neurons without regard to impulse activity in other neurons that 
are also in the same microcircuit. I wish to emphasize the need to study 
neurons simultaneously in the same identified circuit, especially in 
neocortical micro-columns. A given column could perform its func-
tional representations of thought via a combinatorial code across all 
neurons in the column. This idea of combinatorial coding is central to 
the theme of this review and will be explored below. While many inves-
tigators have reported specific impulse patterns associated with certain 
conscious functions, what is lacking is identification of combinatorial 
patterns across multiple neurons in the same circuit.
Impulses give rise to a wide range of correlates of consciousness 
(Koch, 2004). But correlates are not always necessary or sufficient to 
explain consciousness. Not all correlates can be expected to help cause 
consciousness. Even so, consciousness “presents itself,” as Fingelkurts, 
Fingelkurts, and Neves (2010a) put it, and Koch would presumably 
suggest that some sort of neurophysiological processes make that hap-
pen. Therefore, looking for correlates seems to have merit as long as the 
focus is on those correlates that could have a causal effect on conscious 
sense of self.
There are those who argue the need to identify a special process 
within the brain instead of looking for neural correlates. Yet such a 
process is a correlate. Moreover, that process is generated by neuronal 
firing. Consciousness is intrinsically experiential and first-person sub-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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Figure 3.
illustration of the idea of ciPs. in this example small circuit, each neuron generates a certain pattern of spikes, which in turn influences 
a target neuron. For example, the inhibitory neuron #2 shuts down activity in #3, which nonetheless may reactivate when the inhibi-
tion wears off or when excitation comes from another circuit with which it interfaces. collectively, all the neurons in the circuit consti-
tute a combinatorial ciP for a finite segment of time. when embedded within a network of interfacing circuits, such a ciP may become 
part of a more global set of combinatorial ciPs that can be regarded as a representation of specific mental states.
Figure 4.
one simple way to identify any existing combinatoric code of spike trains in a defined network. Moving a small time window across 
simultaneously recorded spike trains allows detection of which neurons produced spikes within that window and the code could be 
read as a sequence of 0 s and 1 s. in this illustration of 10 simulated spike trains, each has the same conventionally calculated interval 
histogram. yet each train contains a “byte” set of serially ordered intervals (expressed here as a “++++” pattern where each interval has 
a longer duration than the succeeding one). this ordering is not otherwise detectable. At any instant of time (vertical dashed lines) 
activity within the whole circuit of 10 neurons can be seen to be indexed as a combinatorial coding of impulses; these can even be 
expressed in quasi-digital form, with presence or absence of an impulse being indicated as a 1 or 0, respectively).
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jective. First-person experiences have to be represented by neuronal 
activity. So, I extend the sensory representation idea mentioned above 
to suggest a more global representation of a sense of self, perceived in 
consciousness. 
Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, and Neves  (2010b) say that conscious-
ness “presents itself,” yet is also an emergent property of brain. My 
interpretation of their explanation is that the operational level of brain 
organization resides in internal physical brain architecture (i.e., ca-
nonical cortical column circuits), and is the basis for conscious sense 
of self. Thus the operational level ties neurophysiological and subjec-
tive domains together. The operational level constitutes consciousness, 
rather than “emits” it in some mysterious way. Consciousness is self-
presenting at the level of operational architectonics of the brain, but is 
emerging in relation to the neurophysiological level of brain organiza-
tion. 
How is the information of neuronal impulses packaged and dis-
tributed? A main purpose of this paper is to encourage neuroscientists 
to consider the possible usefulness of combinatorial mathematics for 
the analysis of CIPs. Until now neuroscientists have not found much 
need to use  combinatorial mathematics, which is a well-established 
math discipline that could be appropriate for testing the role of CIPs 
in consciousness.
Combinatorial coding, as a principle, clearly operates with certain 
neural processes, such as taste and odor perception. Also, an argu-
ment for combinatorial coding is well established for gene expression 
in which traits depend on many  genes (Kobayashi et al., 2000). We 
should consider the possibility of application to neural circuit ope-
ration. Combinatorial coding could be the “operational level” of con-
sciousness that Fingelkurts and co-workers (2010a, 2010b) espouse. A 
simple example of how a combinatorial CIP code might be manifest is 
shown in Figure 4.
Evidence that combinatorial codes exist in cortical circuitry have 
been detected by Reich et al. in 2001 (Reich, Mechler, & Victor, 2001). 
They found evidence of combinatorial codes from samples of up to six 
simultaneously recorded visual cortex neurons. However, they did not 
confirm that the spike trains came from within the same microcolumn. 
Recently,  Osborne  and  colleagues  (Osborne,  Palmer,  Lisberger,  & 
Bialek, 2008) report that temporal patterns of spikes and silence across 
a population of cortical  neurons can carry up to twice as much infor-
mation about visual motion than does population spike count. This 
result held even when they imposed levels of correlation comparable 
to those found in cortical recordings. Again, the spike trains were not 
identified as coming from neurons in the same circuit.    
Another neglected area is the sequential ordering of impulses in 
single spike trains, not to mention ordering across multiple neurons 
in the same circuit. While historically impulse coding research has 
focused on firing rate, it is also clear that important information is car-
ried by when impulses occur. Some 30 years ago, there was significant 
interest in sequential ordering of impulse intervals, but that interest has 
since waned. One, as yet unfalsified, possibility is that serially ordered 
intervals could indicate that spike trains are processed as “bytes” (re-
viewed in Klemm & Sherry, 1982). Although the idea of spike-interval 
coding has long since been abandoned by most neuroscientists, the 
evidence for it has not been refuted. If neural circuits do carry some 
of its information in the form of spike clusters of serially dependent 
intervals, then mixing input from two or more spike trains could pro-
duce an output that preserves the distinct packets of information in 
ways that could be read and differentiated by other circuits to which 
it is projected. 
This model may be somewhat analogous to the genetic code. While 
much of DNA is junk (“noise”), there are many isolated unique pieces 
(“bytes”) that do all the work in highly differentiated ways.
Evidence accumulates that timing of impulses, as opposed to num-
bers per unit of time, are important to information processing in brain. 
For example, phase-locking of single units to oscillations seems to be 
a pre-requisite for successful memory formation (Rutishauser, Ross, 
Mamelak, & Schuman, 2010). Simulation experiments by Masquelier 
and colleagues (Masquelier, Hugues, Gustavo, & Thorpe, 2009)  re-
cently showed that the phase of impulse firing relative to the oscillation 
of  field potentials provides an important learning scheme. In the last 
few years, the neuroscience community has shown increasing interest 
in the role of field-potential coherence in cognitive processes.
Neocortical architecture suggests that its CIP representations either 
enable conscious awareness or are themselves the essence of conscious-
ness. Of course, CIPs, though essential, are themselves dependent on 
biochemical processes such as neurotransmitter systems. 
The CReaTeD CONsCIOUs seNse Of  self
Consider the possibility that conscious mind also has its own CIP rep-
resentation. Specifically, when the brain constructs a sense of self, it 
must do so via neural representation, which takes the form of unique 
CIPs. Most neuroscientists might agree that an idea, for example, has a 
neural representation in a set of CIPs. Is that the same as saying that the 
CIP is the idea? If the idea can be visualized, then it becomes expressed 
when the CIPs include those portions of the visual cortex that create 
the idea in the “mind’s eye.” If the idea can be described verbally, it 
becomes expressed when the CIPs include the language systems in the 
left hemisphere.
Just as certain CIPs are a representation of bodily sensations, the 
brain may also use a unique set of CIPs to generate a consciousness 
sense of self. When we humans are awake, we are automatically con-
scious. Given that much of our awake function is performed subcon-
sciously, that means that both states are launched concurrently, from 
sleep for example. Given that subconscious and conscious functions 
are so different, each could have different CIP representations, which 
would in theory be identifiable and distinguishable.
A conscious mind could emerge when subconscious mind achieves 
a certain “critical mass” of distributed circuit activity that becomes 
interlinked and coordinated in a unique way. This created conscious 
mind then becomes available to enrich the processing of subconscious 
operations. Conscious mind is not aware of the processes of subcon-
scious activity but is aware of the consequences of such activity. No 
longer is the brain limited to execution of existing programs, but now AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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the introspection of conscious mind allows a deeper consideration of 
what is being experienced. 
Most importantly, the subconscious mind now has another source 
of  programming.  Conscious  mind  provides  a  new  dimension  for 
actively programming the subconscious. In short, conscious mind is 
the brain’s way of intervening with itself. This goes to the heart of the 
biological case for free will and personal responsibility. The representa-
tions of self may not be devoted to the external and internal worlds of 
embodied brain, as is required of the representations of subconscious 
mind. Therefore, the sense of self may be less constrained and may have 
more degrees of freedom for its operations. In short, a degree of free 
will may be enabled.
The case for free will is argued elsewhere (Klemm, 2010). Actually, 
this analysis focused on showing flaws in the research reports many 
have used to claim free-will is an illusion. Other than anecdote and 
personal experience, convincing evidence for free will remains to be 
discovered. For the sake of argument, let us consider the possibil-
ity that conscious mind is the “I” of each person, and can sometimes 
be in control. If one thinks of this as an avatar, the conscious mind 
avatar not only can control the subconscious but it can also control 
itself. Conscious mind can choose what to read, what people to associ-
ate with, what is good for the individual, what attitudes to hold and 
adjust, what to believe, and what to do. True, because of pre-existing 
subconscious  programming,  some  conscious  choices  are  more  de-
terministic  than  others.  But  because  of  conscious  mind,  everyone 
can at least become aware of the price being paid for bad choices and 
have  the  option  to  change  course,  to  change  brain’s  programming 
accordingly.
It is clear that a brain avatar could make such choices. What is 
less clear is whether those choices are freely willed. But the neural 
representation for the sense of self is probably quite different from the 
representations held in subconscious mind. Subconscious representa-
tions are constrained by the realities of the physical world, both inside 
and outside the body. The conscious avatar has no such constraint, 
because it’s representations are not necessarily referenced to worldly 
events. True, the avatar representations are often modified and biased 
by the output of subconscious programming, as evidence by mental 
“knee-jerk” responses. 
Another area of distinction is the capacity for introspection, which 
by definition occurs in the consciousness of the avatar. Introspection 
processes  likely  have  their  own  neural  representations  which  yield 
choices, decisions, and commands. Introspection expands the realm 
of alternatives for what to do. This is equivalent to expanding the 
degrees of freedom for the avatar’s actions. The avatar could be less 
rigidly programmed than subconscious mind. Therefore, the infor-
mation processing occurring in the representations of self should be 
less deterministic – perhaps to the point of allowing a degree of free
will. 
I agree with those who say who we are is largely learned through 
experience Much of this learning has occurred and is “remembered” 
implicitly and subconsciously (LeDoux, 2002). Consciousness, given 
the nature of the brain systems that enable it, is able to participate 
in this learned sense of self. Consistent with this view, LeDoux also 
contends that the self is constructed. This construction is a life-long 
learning  process,  being  most  evident  during  childhood.  Babies, 
for example, initially seem to act as if they are an extension of the 
mother  and  progressively  develop  indicators  of  self-awareness. 
What  they  learn  about  themselves  is  presumably  reflected  in 
their CIPs.
WhaT CIPs Of CONsCIOUsNess                         
RePReseNT
The brain not only contains CIP representations of things we have 
experienced, but it also can create CIP representations of things and 
events that we have never experienced. Creativity is a marvelous mys-
tery. Creating a representation of things never seen nor experienced re-
quires reconstituting in unique ways the CIP representations of things 
we have seen or experienced. No one knows how the brain decides 
which circuits to engage to generate creative thought. No one knows 
why some brains are better at the creative process than others. Nor 
do we know if brains can be taught to be more creative, or if so, how 
to do it.
Regardless of what CIPs produce the “I” of consciousness, those 
processes should also be capable of modifying their processing accord-
ing to the nature of their output, some of which is represented in the 
consciousness. When we have a conscious experience, the neural proc-
esses that make us aware of the output of those circuits provide a physi-
cal substrate for self-adjustment, which may also be manifest in the con-
sciousness. In other words, the brain can control its own consciousness.
If thoughts are tagged in the form of CIPs, how does the brain make 
itself aware of its own CIPs? Does the brain have some sort of meta-
tagging mechanism wherein each CIP is itself tagged in a way so that 
multiple CIPs, when merged at the same time, now have an emergent 
property that enables an awareness of what the various CIPs represent? 
If so, how could any such meta-tagging be accomplished?
The process could operate at both subconscious and conscious 
levels.  The difference for conscious mind, however, could be that con-
scious mind does not “see” the original stimulus, but mainly “looks in 
on” the CIP representation being held in subconscious mind (sCIPs). 
Conscious mind may contain CIP (cCIP) representations of another 
sort. Namely, the brain creates a separate conscious mind that is rep-
resentation of self-identity, as opposed to representations of external 
world. Note the emphasis here is that the self-awareness of conscious-
ness is constructed, rather than emergent. Thus, the sense of self-iden-
tity can grow with time, being modified by biological maturation and 
learning experience, resulting in evolving CIP representations. 
One may be tempted to conclude that consciousness is a figment 
of our imagination. Not so. Our sense of individual identity really does 
exist, presumably in the form of CIPs. Similar things could be said for 
subconscious mind. The CIPs are themselves very real and subject to 
biological forces. They are also subject to what many people would call 
mentalistic forces, given that those mentalistic forces are actually medi-
ated by CIPs. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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This view gives rise to the proposition that conscious mind is a CIP 
avatar that act as the brain’s active agent, a “free will” partner in brain 
function that operates in parallel and in conjunction with subconscious 
mind to make the total brain function more adaptive and powerful 
than could be achieved with subconscious mind only. Evolutionarily, 
such co-evolution may be the mechanism that changed pre-humans 
from zombies to who we are today.
The CONsCIOUsNess Of DReamINg
The sense of self persists in dreams, and thus we should consider that 
dreams are a special form of consciousness. In a separate paper, I will 
present a theory for why humans dream, more specifically, why they 
have the periodic episodes of rapid-eye movement sleep which pro-
mote dreaming. Suffice it to say here that EEG signs during dreaming 
are similar to those seen in alert wakefulness, and thus the same CIP 
and coherence mechanisms that operate in causing consciousness may 
also operate during dreaming.
POPUlaR RelaTeD VIeWs
In the last decade, it has become common for theorists to invoke oscil-
latory synchronization as the basis for consciousness. The emphasis is 
usually on electromagnetic fields, which as a practical matter are usu-
ally monitored as the EEG or field potentials from within the brain. 
Cortical column assemblies oscillate because the microcircuits in a 
mini-column oscillate, and since mini-columns are cross connected, 
they can couple with each other with varying degrees of time locking. 
Such  functional  coupling  provides  a  basis  for  binding  the  distrib-
uted functions and thus generating unified perceptions and thoughts 
(Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Singer, 2001). 
A flurry of publications in the last few years clearly implicates field 
potential oscillation and synchrony among brain areas in conscious-
ness. But most researchers have not made the most of their data. For 
example, one index of degree of consciousness could well be the ratio 
of gamma activity to activity at other frequencies. Another index could 
be frequency-band-specific differences in the level and topographic 
distribution of coherence within and between frequencies.
Not everyone accepts the leading theory that high-frequency co-
herence mediates the binding of fragmented sensory elements, such 
as bars and edges in a visual scene, and could similarly bind cogni-
tive processes (Shadlen & Movshon, 1999). Evidence that synchrony 
promotes binding is indirect and incomplete at best. It may be true, 
as critics argue, that synchrony is only the signature of sensory (and 
presumably cognitive) binding. No compelling explanation is yet avail-
able for how synchrony actually achieves binding. In any case, changes 
in synchrony must be generated by underlying combinatorially coded 
CIPs. 
Yet even critics conclude that synchronicity must be important, 
and it might be uniquely  important to the issue of consciousness. To 
be dismissive of oscillatory synchronization is a kind of physiological 
nihilism and is not warranted by the huge number of phenomena with 
which it has been associated (Buzsáki, 2006). Transient synchroniza-
tion of field potential oscillations reflects the underlying linkage and 
unified  function  of  large  neuronal  networks.  Consciousness  likely 
depends on large-scale cortical network synchronization in multiple 
frequency bands (not just the ever-popular 40 Hz). Thus, it may be that 
it is not binding as such that creates consciousness, but rather the kind 
of binding or to the accessibility to the product of binding by conscious 
mind. 
For instance a study of EEG coherence responses to ambiguous 
figure stimuli (Klemm, Li, & Hernandez, 2000), evaluated the cogni-
tive  binding  associated  with  the  “eureka”  of  sudden  realization  of 
the alternative percept in ambiguous-figure drawings. This cognitive 
eureka was manifest in widespread spatial coherence in two or more 
frequency bands. These might even have had meaningful synchroniza-
tion with each other, but that was not tested. Even so, it is not clear why 
or how consciousness would arise from multiple-frequency binding 
unless the coherence in different frequencies carries different informa-
tion. One frequency might carry the information while another might 
carry the conscious awareness of the information. Another possibility 
is that coherence creates consciousness only if enough different areas 
of the brain share in the coherence. These are compelling questions 
for  future  research.  Ambiguous-figure  stimuli  are  especially  useful 
because the brain can simultaneously hold a conscious perception and 
a subconscious representation of the identical physical stimulus of the 
retina. Also, a human can consciously control which of the alternative 
percepts are consciously perceived at any given moment.
 It seems likely that only a fraction of subconscious processing is 
accessible at any one time, suggesting that only a sub-set of CIPs could 
acquire the conditions necessary for consciousness or that access to 
certain subconscious networks is blocked by inhibition. The corollary is 
that conscious registration may have limited “carrying capacity,” which 
is definitely demonstrable in the case of working memory. Maybe this 
is because the CIPs of consciousness have to hold in awareness and 
working memory not only the CIP information from the subconscious 
and ongoing external input but also those for the sense of self and all 
that it entails.
Oscillation coupling determines which neuronal assemblies com-
municate at any particular instant, and thus the brain can re-wire itself 
dynamically on a time scale of milliseconds without any need for chang-
ing synaptic hardware (Izhikevich, Desai, Walcott, & Hoppensteadt, 
2003). A change in frequency allows various neuronal assemblies to 
process information with minimal cross interference and even allows 
neurons or mini-columns to participate in different macro-assemblies 
simply by changing frequency and coherence coupling.
A recently elaborated theory of consciousness (Fingelkurts et al., 
2010a, 2010b) bears some resemblance to the avatar idea in the sense 
that consciousness is thought to arise as a special form of oscillation and 
synchronization of field potentials among cortical columns. These volt-
age fields appear as quasi-stationary epochs (from about 30 ms to 6 s) 
epochs and reflect the underlying mental operations. Synchronization 
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semblies  located  in  different  brain  areas  produce  spatial-temporal 
patterns (operational modules, OM) responsible for complex mental 
operations. OMs can be further synchronized among each other, form-
ing even more complex OMs. Some OMs are equivalent to thoughts. 
OMs exist as long as there is synchrony of operations that constitute 
it. Therefore some OMs “live” longer than others; and, therefore some 
thoughts are longer than others.
The  brain  produces  a  range  of  long  and  short  thoughts  which 
may operate like “frames” of a motion picture. The frames arise from 
activity in neurons as they interact in oscillatory fashion within and 
across their local networks. These frames, separated by interludes of 
less neuronal participation, are concantenated to produce a stream of 
thought. Certain kinds of frames give rise to consciousness. Conscious 
thought arises when the cortical columns creating the frames become 
sufficiently cross-linked and coordinated.
This view seems to have some limitations. First, the frame idea ap-
plies most directly to alpha rhythm which can occur as short epochs 
of a fixed frequency oscillation where the amplitude waxes and wanes 
over successive time epochs. However, long sustained epochs of alpha 
occur in relaxed meditative states, not states of more demanding think-
ing. Also, a few patently conscious people do not exhibit alpha. There is 
also the problem that high-frequency oscillations in the gamma range 
and beyond would seem less likely to exist in segmented frame form 
and more likely to fuse as a continuum.
 The main problem is the underlying question of where the oscillat-
ing fields come from. One is led to think the conscious realizations come 
from the field potentials themselves. Ignored is the underlying role of 
the CIPs that generate the oscillations in the first place. Oscillatory 
fields certainly reflect what is happening during thinking, but may 
not be the cause. They certainly are not equivalent to the underlying 
discrete CIPs whose flow through circuitry may be modulated by the 
field-potential environment in which they propagate. However, this 
point is implicit in the statement in the Fingelkurts’ paper (Fingelkurt 
et al., 2010a, 2010b) to the effect that thought operations are “indexed” 
by the EEG. But the key question is: Are field potentials the message 
or a reflection of the message? Is it the fields that are interacting or the 
message exchange of combinatorial impulse codes?
sUPPORTINg eVIDeNCe fOR a CIP 
TheORy
There are lines of evidence that support the CIP theory in addition 
to the rationale just developed. Evidence falls into two categories of 
predictions: 
1. The CIPs, or some manifestation thereof, such as the EEG or field 
potentials, should change as the state of consciousness changes. 
2. Changing the CIPs or their manifestation should change the state 
of consciousness.
In the first category, the whole history of EEG studies, both in labo-
ratories and in hospital settings, attests to the fact that there is generally 
a strong correlation between the EEG and the state of consciousness. 
There are apparent exceptions, but these EEG-behavioral dissociations, 
as they are called, can be attributed to methodology or to misinterpre-
tations of the state of consciousness (Klemm, 1992).
For example, an apparent arousal EEG does not always suggests 
consciousness. Reports of EEG in lower animal species, like fish and 
amphibians, show what seems to be an “activated” EEG even dur-
ing behavioral quiescence that superficially looks like sleep (Klemm, 
1973). What is not clear is the frequency band of such EEGs. Such data 
were obtained before the age of digital EEG and frequency analysis. We 
know little about the full frequency band and the coherences of various 
frequency bands in the EEG of any non-primate species. It is entirely 
possible that lower animals only have beta activity (less than about 30 
per second).  Moreover, the degree and topography of coherences have 
never been subjected to examination in any lower species. 
The general well-known observations can be summarized as follows:
1. In the highest state of consciousness and alert wakefulness, the 
EEG is dominated by low voltage-fast activity, typically including 
oscillations in the frequency band of 40 and more waves per sec-
ond.
2. In relaxed, meditative states of consciousness, the EEG is domi-
nated by slower activity, often including so-called alpha waves of 
8-12 per second.
3. In emotionally agitated states, the EEG often contains a great deal 
of so-called theta activity of 4-7 waves per second activity.
4. In drowsy and sleep states, the EEG is dominated by large, ir-
regular slow waves of 1-4 per second. 
5. In coma, the trend for slowing of activity continues, but the sig-
nal magnitude may be greatly suppressed.
6. In death, there is no EEG signal.
Because the EEG is a manifestation of overall CIP activity and an 
“envelope” of it, such changes in EEG correlates of consciousness sup-
port the notion that it is changes in CIP that create changes in the state 
of consciousness. Even so, these are just correlations, and correlation is 
not the same as causation.
More convincing evidence comes when changing the CIPs, either 
through disease or through some external manipulation, changes the 
state of consciousness. For instance, massive cerebral strokes may wipe 
out conscious responsiveness to stimuli from large segments of the 
body. Injection of a sufficient dose of anesthetic produces immedi-
ate change in neural activity and unconsciousness ultimately follows. 
Naturally occurring epilepsy causes massive, rapid bursts of neural 
activity that wipe out consciousness. Even during the “auras” that often 
precede an epileptic attack, there are localized signs of epileptic dis-
charge and the patient is very often consciously aware that a full-blown 
attack may soon ensue (Schulz et al., 1995). 
Another line of evidence comes from the modern experimental tech-
nique of transcranial magnetic stimulation. Imposing large magnetic 
fields across discrete areas of scalp is apparently harmless and produces 
reversible changes in brain electrical activity that in turn are associated 
with changes in conscious awareness.  A wide range of changes in con-
sciousness functions can be produced depending on the extent of tis-
sue exposed to the magnetic field stimulus (Grafman & Wassermann, 
1998;  see  also  Capotosto,  Babiloni,  Romani,  &  Corbetta,  2009).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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UNleashINg The self-CONsCIOUs 
aVaTaR
During consciousness, the circuitry of the Avatar learns, memorizes, 
retrieves, and interprets its representation of self. That construct ap-
pears every time the necessary CIP conditions are met, as when we 
wake up each morning in response to a brainstem reticular formation 
disinhibition of the cortical circuitry that has kept us asleep. 
How  can  the  Avatar  get  generated  each  day?  There  must  be  a 
threshold for the non-linear processes that create the conditions for 
emergence of the Avatar from its memory store. Though some people 
wake up in the morning more groggy that others, consciousness at 
least in some people suddenly “comes on,” like a light switch. Although 
after anesthesia there may be unconscious thrashing about (that’s why 
they strap you down on the gurney), emergence from anesthesia seems 
instantaneous. Though we cannot yet specify these processes in detail, 
we know that once consciousness threshold is reached, the effect must 
involve CIPs in the consciousness system.
  Could we be consciously aware of our other senses of smell, taste, 
sight, hearing, etc. without having a sense of self? In the real time dur-
ing which subconscious mind registers sensations, the consciousness 
Avatar must also be perceiving the sensations. How can this be? Is there 
some shared access to sensation? How is the sharing accomplished? 
Consider the following example in which the eyes detect a tree (Figure 5).
Conscious mind monitors and adjusts as necessary its representa-
tion of itself. It also monitors some of the CIP representations of sub-
conscious mind, but presumably has no direct access to the operations 
of unconscious mind. The representations of self in conscious mind 
can do other free-will kinds of things, such as reflect on what it knows, 
plans, decides, and vetoes. In other words, conscious mind is a “mind 
of its own.”
TesTabIlITy Of The CIP aVaTaR        
TheORy
The idea that non-conscious, subconscious, and conscious minds are 
represented by CIPs seems reasonable. Consciousness research might 
be better spent trying to falsify CIP hypotheses about mind than with 
more fanciful ideas such as Bayesian probability, chaos theory, quan-
tum mechanics, dark energy, or others. 
Any scientific theory should have the potential for being tested or 
shown to be false. But how can one possibly test this theory − or any 
other theory of consciousness?  Yet this should not be an excuse to do 
nothing.
The CIP theory does have the virtue of being based on what we al-
ready know to be the currency of information processing in the brain, 
at least for the non-conscious and subconscious brain. We may not 
need to invoke metaphors and mathematical models. We do not have 
Figure 5.
the image is mapped in subconscious mind by a ciP representation. the brain searches its circuits for a template match in memory. 
when a match occurs, the brain searches further in memory stores for other associations, such as the word tree and any emotional 
associations. the memory ciPs are then accessed by the ciPs of the consciousness Avatar which becomes aware of what the subcon-
scious mind has processed (and does so in its context of self: “i see the tree”).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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to invoke either ghosts or science of the future (such as dark matter or 
dark energy).
What is it we need experiments to prove? Certainly not the idea 
that consciousness acts like an Avatar. That is just a metaphor, which 
has little explanatory power. Metaphors create the illusion of under-
standing the real thing. Here, the term Avatar is used in an operational 
way; that is, consciousness is an agent of embodied brain. It is real, 
not metaphor. We don’t live in some kind of cyberspace like the movie 
Matrix. We are our consciousness. 
Two main experimental approaches seem feasible. One can either 
disrupt  CIPs  by  external  means  and  monitor  resultant  changes  in 
conscious thought or attempt to compare CIPs when consciousness is 
present versus when it is not.
Disrupting CIPs 
We already know that consciousness can be abolished or dramati-
cally disrupted by disruption of CIPs, as with anesthesia, heavy drug 
sedation, or electroconvulsive shock. A more nuanced approach can 
be achieved with trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (TCMS; Walsh 
&  Pascual-Leone,  2003).  Such  stimulation  indiscriminately  affects 
both excitatory and inhibitory neurons, but it most certainly disrupts 
whatever CIPs are present at the time of stimulation. The technique 
is usually applied focally on specific parts of the neocortex. By selec-
tively altering the CIPs of parts of neocortex that have specific con-
scious functions, such as language comprehension, musical analysis, 
or  certain  conscious  spatial  tasks,  one  could  demonstrate  an  asso-
ciation between disruption of CIPs in a given area with disruption 
of the conscious operations usually performed by that area. Anodal 
stimulation  increases  spike  firing  rates,  while  cathodal  stimulation 
decreases it.
Some evidence exists that TCMS changes power and phase of EEG 
oscillation. One study shows that TCMS changed  the ratio of alpha 
to gamma activity over the human parietal cortex, while at the same 
time increasing the accuracy of a cognitive task (Johnson, Hamidi, & 
Postle, 2009).
An effect on conscious choice behavior has recently been reported. 
Anodal stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the left 
hemisphere and simultaneous cathodal stimulation of the correspond-
ing area in the right hemisphere changed the freely chosen  strategy for 
guessing whether a random draw from a deck of cards would be red 
or black, but the opposite stimulus condition did not (Hecht, Walsh, 
& Lavidor, 2010).
Cognitive responses to TCMS would confirm only a role for CIPs 
and not the proposed Avatar. But it might be possible by manipulat-
ing TCMS pulsing parameters and topography to dissect implicit from 
explicit operations and show that implicit processing remains while the 
explicit Avatar function disappears. Use of ambiguous-figure percep-
tion could be quite useful here.
It is also important to conduct TCMS studies during sleep and 
other  forms  of  unconsciousness.  Would  TCMS  of  ARAS  areas  in 
an  awake  subject  induce  sleep?  Would  TCMS  delivered  to  focal 
areas of cortex during sleep influence dream content that is specific
to that cortical area (such as TCMS of visual cortex inducing visual 
hallucinations)?
TCMS, however, has its limits. One should expect, for example, that 
applying focal TCMS over the part of cortex that recognizes specific 
objects would alter the subject’s cognitive responses. But such studies 
might yield interesting findings about whether the subject knows er-
rors are being made if corrective feedback is not supplied. 
Monitoring CIPs 
We can never describe the CIPs of consciousness until we can record 
what they are. That would require simultaneous recording of impulse 
patterns from many neurons in identified circuits. Such a process is 
expedited by knowing in advance which brain areas are necessary for 
generating a given conscious operation. The topography of specific 
conscious operations could be identified with field-potential coher-
ences and/or TCMS.
To monitor CIPs successfully, we may need better methods of im-
pulse pattern detection and description. Combinatorial mathematics 
will likely be a necessary tool in such investigations. We will also need 
better methods for examining shifting patterns of synchrony of multi-
ple units or field potentials among multiple impulse generators.
To detect CIPs most meaningfully, investigators may need to iden-
tify combinatorial patterns of nerve impulses at successive time incre-
ments, but also look for embedded serially ordered impulse interval 
“bytes” across each neuron in the circuit. For example, if a “+++−“ 
pattern occurs non-randomly in one neuron during a given cognitive 
state, there may be temporal linkage to that or some other ordered pat-
tern elsewhere in the circuit. 
To monitor impulse activity in distributed circuits could require 
hundreds, even thousands of microelectrodes implanted directly into 
the brain. A more limited approach would be akin to that mentioned 
above, wherein one characterizes CIPs in a limited section (microcol-
umn) of cortex that is associated with specific conscious functions. It 
may suffice just to monitor a few of the neurons in a given identified 
circuit.  Good  candidate  conscious  functions  might  include  touch 
perception,  language  comprehension,  musical  analysis,  or  certain 
conscious spatial tasks. Perhaps an optical method can be developed 
where impulse-sensitive dyes can display, in three dimensions, the im-
pulse activity coming from individual neurons. Also, to the extent that 
coherence may be a key mechanism, we need more robust statistical 
methods that get beyond pair-wise correlation coefficients to detect 
coherence of activity from multiple locations.
Animal studies provide the best chance to place multiple-electrode 
arrays into multiple cortical columns and thereby observe associations 
of certain CIPs with certain cognitive processes, ranging from simple 
choice behavior to learning-to-learn situations. TCMS application to 
these areas could help determine if the CIPs are mere correlates or 
causally involved.  Nanotechnology may lead the way in providing the 
needed electrode arrays. At a minimum, such electrodes would have 
to be placed in one cortical column, one or more adjacent columns, 
and one or more remote columns that is known to have hard-wired 
connection. There is the problem of course of what we assume about AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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animal consciousness, a problem that diminishes the higher up the 
phylogenetic scale one goes. Studies in humans, such as patients with 
severe epilepsy that require electrode placement, might be feasible. 
Studies of this kind could also shed some light on the role of combina-
torial coding for conscious processes.
It is entirely possible that if combinatorially coded CIP changes 
cause consciousness, they would be expressed as  changed  field-po-
tential patterns in topographical and co-frequency coherence. Several 
important comparisons should be made. We can, for example, com-
pare normal adults with babies at various stages of their brain’s matura-
tion. Another way to test is to compare activity in comatose patients 
(locked-in state, and persistent vegetative state) with normal subjects.
An alternative to recording from multiple units is to let averaged 
evoked response potentials (ERP) in multiple cortical locations serve 
as the index of differential CIPs. The usefulness of ERP for monitoring 
conscious operations has been documented in such studies as early 
language learning in babies. ERP signatures of phonetic learning are 
evident at 11 months, responses to known words at 14 months, and 
syntactic and semantic learning at 2.5 years (Kuhl & Rivera-Gaxiola, 
2008). ERP approaches could allow us to monitor impulse activity at 
a population level and identify evoked responses in different cortical 
areas under conditions when conscious awareness is manipulated, as 
with sleep or drugs. Changing conscious state would surely produce 
topographical changes in evoked response, which in turn can only be 
caused by changes in CIPs. This would not prove the existence of the 
Avatar, but it could certainly prove a role for CIPs in consciousness. 
Finally, quantitative EEG signals from numerous locations might 
indirectly indicate meaningful evidence of the elusive Avatar. Special 
attention should be paid to the topography of coherence patterns and 
coherences among frequencies. Comparison of such parameters in dif-
ferent states, such as sleep and wakefulness, or under different TCMS 
conditions, would be essential. Also helpful would be comparison of 
EEG  coherences in babies as their own sense of self develops. Studies 
could be tied to the age at which self-recognition in a mirror emerges. 
IssUes IN TesT DesIgN
The CIPs and frequency coherences must surely differ between sub-
conscious  thinking  and  conscious  thinking.  This  poses  significant 
problems,  since  both  processes  presumably  operate  in  parallel  at 
roughly the same time. With these basic assumptions, a few questions 
arise that could influence design of experiments: 
1.  How can we identify specific conscious functions and their as-
sociated neural activity?
For example, we can design experiments that will record from or 
manipulate specific cortical areas known to mediate specific conscious 
functions, such as speech centers, somatosensory cortex, premotor 
neocortex, and mirror-neuron zones.
More studies are needed with ambiguous figures. The beauty of 
evaluating perception of ambiguous figures is that one can compare 
the same image when it is consciously perceived and when it is not. 
Evaluating combinatorially coded CIPs from defined circuits in hu-
mans may not be feasible (electrodes implanted to detect epileptic 
foci are not normally placed in the areas of neocortex that would be 
most useful for study of visual percepts). CIPs might be amenable to 
study in monkeys, assuming some clever artist can design ambiguous 
figures that have biological meaning to monkeys (such as a drawing 
that could be interpreted either as an apple or as a pear). Certainly 
coherence studies such as the one my lab performed can be extended
 in humans, and focal TCMS can be used to see how the percept can be 
changed.
2. How can we distinguish subconscious and conscious thinking 
under otherwise comparable conditions?
Perhaps this might be accomplished by comparing a classically 
conditioned response (subconscious) with the same motor activity 
generated through conscious and voluntary decision.
3. Is the distinction between subconscious and conscious processes 
attributable to CIPs or to frequency coherences or both?
Obviously,  the  experiment  ideally  would  examine  both  combi-
natorial coding of CIPs and frequency coherences of field potentials 
recorded at the same time and under the same conditions.
4. Are the distinguishing characteristics of subconscious and con-
scious thinking restricted to the specific cortical area under investi-
gation or do other more distant brain areas differentially participate, 
depending on whether the thought is subconscious or conscious?
Obviously,  the  design  should  also  include  monitoring  of  other 
cortical areas that directly connect to the specific conscious processing 
areas.
5. What kinds of discrete conscious thoughts might be useful?
Possible tasks could include word priming (speech centers), will-
ful intent to make certain movements (premotor cortex), or situations 
where an observer witnesses an action by another that takes place 
within and without the observer’s personal space (mirror neuron sites). 
The latter approach can be tested in monkeys, where distinct mirror 
neurons can be identified, or in humans where fMRI methods can 
identify areas which appear to function as a “mirror neuron system” 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999).
6. Can we know if the CIPs and frequency coherences of subcon-
scious thinking occupy the same circuitry as do those of conscious 
thinking? Is the neural activity synchronous during both kinds of 
thinking or is there a phase lag?
It would seem necessary to simultaneously monitor neural activity 
in several places, such as adjacent cortical columns and columns in the 
other hemisphere that are directly connected.
7. How can we distinguish between the “noise” of background neu-
ral activity of consciousness as a global state of special awareness 
and the activity associated with specific conscious thought?
Experiments must include a conscious null-state in which day-
dreaming is minimized, and perhaps avoided altogether by including 
some kind of conscious focus on a single task concurrent with the 
conscious thought task under investigation. For example, one might 
require a subject to operate a joy stick that tracks a slowly moving 
target on a computer screen while at the same time performing the 
conscious task under investigation.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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8. What possible neural mechanisms could provide the “Avatar” 
circuitry with a “free-will agency” capability that is not found in 
subconscious mind?
Experiments should compare a subject’s performance of the con-
scious task at freely selected intervals, rather than on cue. Alternatively, 
the subject could function in a cued mode, but freely choose whether 
to generate or withhold response to the cue. The experiments can be 
based on electrical recordings of previously discovered CIP or fre-
quency coherence signatures of a specific conscious thought or when 
subjects attempt the task when the cortical areas are temporarily disa-
bled, was with local anesthetic or focal TCMS.
CONClUsIONs
Brains construct representations of what they detect and think about. 
The representations take the form of patterned nerve impulses propa-
gating through circuits and networks (circuit impulse patterns, CIPs). 
This representational scheme has been unequivocally demonstrated 
for both non-conscious and subconscious minds. 
Conscious mind must also be a CIP representation, but unique 
in that the constructed  representations are of a sixth sense of self, an 
awareness of embodied self and what the self encounters and engages. 
Thus, this mind may automatically know what it is knowing. This rep-
resentation is actually an agent, more or less equivalent to an Avatar, 
serving the brain’s interests and imperatives. The conscious Avatar 
knows information the same way the non-conscious mind does; that 
is, through CIP representations of that information. So, the key ques-
tion is “What is different about the CIPs of consciousness and those 
of non-consciousness or sub-consciousness?” The CIPs of the Avatar 
likely differ in spatial and temporal distribution.
The Avatar is a CIP representation itself but also an interpreter of 
the representations in the brain. It interprets not just linguistically, but 
also in such terms as non-verbalized sensations, reinforcement contin-
gencies, emotions, and probable outcomes of action alternatives. The 
Avatar probably has more degrees of operational freedom and could 
act as a “free will” partner that operates in parallel and in conjunction 
with subconscious mind to make the total brain function more adap-
tive and powerful than could be achieved with subconscious mind only 
(Klemm, 2010). 
CIPs, as the currency of thought, seem essential for consciousness. 
Still, the CIP hypothesis may not be sufficient to understand conscious 
mind. But research on the CIPs and associated field potentials asso-
ciated with consciousness seems at least as justifiable as research on 
the other theories of Bayesian probability, chaos theory, and quantum 
mechanics. Conscious mind may operate in many ways like everything 
else the brain does. We don’t necessarily have to invoke mathemati-
cal models or particle physics or dark matter/dark energy. Conscious 
mind  constructs  CIP  representations  just  as  do  subconscious  and 
non-conscious minds, with the difference that what is represented in 
conscious mind is not the outside world or the world of the body, but 
rather the world of ego. Conscious mind is a CIP representation of the 
sense of self. This identity is learned, beginning with the fetus and new-
born, and develops as the brain develops capacity to represent itself 
consciously. In short, you have learned to be you. I have learned to be 
me. Our Avatar nature enables us to change who we are. 
The brain creates a CIP representation of its embodied self using 
visual, tactile, and proprioceptive sensations. Added to this is a repre-
sentation of personal space that includes a representation of the self in 
three dimensional space. Long-term memory stores this representation 
and it is released for operation and updating whenever consciousness 
is triggered.
The Avatar CIPs are accessible to the subconscious mind operations 
that generate the Avatar. The brain knows that it has this Avatar and 
knows what it is doing. Stimuli and assorted thoughts are not isolated. 
The Avatar knows consciously because its information is processed 
within the Avatar’s CIP representation of the sense of self. This repre-
sentation is the awareness and the attendant thought. 
Proposed here is the idea that conscious perception arises from 
combinatorial coding of CIPs. We don’t really know what combinato-
rial coding means, other than to make the less-than-helpful conclusion 
that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. At least, however, 
we have good reason to believe that what is being coded is the spatio-
temporal distribution of spikes and the field potentials they generate in 
multiple linked neurons.
The needed research tools are at hand for identifying the neural 
causes of the conscious sense of self. Let the race begin.
acknowledgements
The  author  wishes  to  thank  Andrew  Fingelkurts  for  his  criti-
cal reading of an early draft of this manuscript and his constructive 
suggestions. Helpful suggestions from anonymous reviewers are also 
acknowledged and appreciated.
RefeRences
Binzegger, t., douglas, r. J., & Martin, A. c. (2005). cortical archi-
tecture. in M. de gregorio, v. di Mayo, M. Frucci, & c. Mucio 
(eds.), BVAI 2005: LNCS (vol. 3704, pp. 15-28). Berlin: springer-
verlag.
Burkhalter, A. (2008). Many specialists for suppressing cortical 
excitation. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 2, 155-167.
Buzsáki, g. (2006). Rhythms of the brain. oxford: oxford University 
Press.
capotosto, P., Babiloni, c., romani, g. l., & corbetta, M. (2009). 
Frontoparietal cortex controls spatial attention through mod-
ulation of anticipatory alpha rhythms. Journal of Neuroscience, 
29(18), 5863-5872.
dacosta, n. M., & Martin, K. A. (2010). whose cortical column 
would  that  be?  Frontiers  in  Neuroanatomy,  4(16),  1-10. 
doi: 10. 3389/fnana.2010.00016
douglas, r. J., & Martin, K. A. (2004). neuronal circuits of the neo-
cortex. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 419-451.
doya, K., ishii, s., Pouget, A., &  rao, r. P. n. (eds.). (2007). Bayesian 
brain:  Probabilistic  approaches  to  neural  coding.  cambridge, 
MA: Mit Press.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2011 • volume 7 • 16-30 29
edelman, g. M., & tononi, g. (2000). A universe of consciousness: 
How matter becomes imagination. new york: Basic Books.
Fingelkurts,  Andrew  A.,  Fingelkurts,  Alexander  A.,  &  neves, 
c.  F.  h.  (2010a).  natural  world  physical,  brain  operational, 
and mind phenomenal space-time. Physics of Life Reviews, 7, 
195-249.
Fingelkurts,  Andrew  A.,  Fingelkurts,  Alexander  A.,  &  neves,  c. 
F.  h.  (2010b).  emergentist  monism,  biological  realism,  op-
erations  and  brain–mind  problem.  Physics  of  Life  Reviews, 
7, 264–268.
Freeman, w. J. (2007). indirect biological measures of conscious-
ness from field studies of brains as dynamical systems. Neural 
Networks, 20, 1021-1031.
Freeman, w. J. (2009). consciousness, intentionality, and causality.   
in s. Pockett, w. P. Banks, & s. gallagher (eds.), Does conscious-
ness cause behavior? (pp. 73-105). cambridge, MA: Mit Press.
Fries,  P.,  reynolds,  J.  h.,  rorie,  A.  e.,  &  desimone,  r.  (2001). 
Modulation of oscillatory neuronal synchronization by selec-
tive visual attention. Science, 291, 1560-1563.
grafman,  J.,  &  wassermann,  e.  (1998).  transcranial  magnetic 
stimulation can measure and modulate learning and memory. 
Neuropsychologia, 37(2), 159-167. 
hecht, d., walsh, v., & lavidor, M. (2010). transcranial direct cur-
rent stimulation facilitates decision making in a probabilistic 
guessing task. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(12), 4241- 4245.
herculano-houzel, s. (2009). the human brain in numbers: A lin-
early scaled-up primate brain. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 
3(31), 1-11. doi:10.3389/neuro.09.031.2009
hubel,  d.  h.,  & wiesel, t.  n.  (1959).  receptive  fields  of  single 
neurones in the cat’s striate cortex. Journal of Physiology, 148, 
574-591.
hubel, d. h., & wiesel, t. n. (1962). receptive fields, binocular in-
teraction and functional architecture in the cat’s visual cortex. 
Journal of Physiology, 160, 106-154.
iacoboni,  M., woods,  r.  P.,  Brass,  M.,  Bekkering,  h.,  Mazziotta, 
J. c., & rizzolatti, g. (1999). cortical mechanisms of human 
imitation. Science, 286(5449), 2526–2528. doi:10.1126/science. 
286.5449.2526
izhikevich, e. M. (2007). Dynamical systems in neuroscience. The ge-
ometry of excitability and bursting. cambridge, MA: Mit Press.
izhikevich, e. M., desai, n. s., walcott, e. c., & hoppensteadt, F. 
c.  (2003).  Bursts  as  a  unit  of  neural  information.  selective 
communication  via  resonance.  Trends  in  Neuroscience,  26, 
161-167.
Jefferys, J. g., & whittington, M. A. (1996). review of the role of 
inhibitory neurons in chronic epileptic foci induced by intrac-
erebral tetanus toxin. Epilepsy Research, 26(1), 59-66.
Johnson, J. s., hamidi, M. X., & Postle, B. r. (2009, october). It’s not 
a “Virtual lesion.” Evaluating the effects of rTMS on neural activity 
and behavior. Poster presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
society for neuroscience, chicago, il. 
Jones, e. g. (1998). viewpoint: the core and matrix of thalamic 
organization.  Neuroscience,  85(2),  331–345.  doi:10.1016/s03 
06-4522(97)00581-2
Jones,  e.  g.  (2000).  Microcolumns  in  the  cerebral  cortex. 
Proceedings  of  the  National  Academy  of  Science  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  97(10),  5019-5021.  doi:10.1073/
pnas.97.10.5019  
Klemm,  w.  r.  (1973).  typical  electroencephalograms:    ver-
tebrates. in P. l. Altman & d. s. dittmer (eds.), Biology data book 
(vol. 2, 2nd ed., pp. 1254-1260). Bethesda, Md: Federation of 
American societies for experimental Biology.
Klemm, w. r. (1992). Are there eeg correlates of animal thinking 
& feeling. Neuropsychobiology, 26, 151-165.
Klemm, w. r. (2010). Free will: simple experiments are not so sim-
ple. Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 6, 47-65.
Klemm, w. r., li, t. h., & hernandez, J. l. (2000). coherent eeg 
indicators of cognitive binding during ambiguous figure tasks. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 66-85.
Klemm, w. r., & sherry, c. J.  (1982). do neurons process informa-
tion  by  relative  intervals  in  spike  trains?  Neuroscience  and 
Biobehavioral Review, 6, 429-437.
Klemm, w. r., & vertes, r. (1990). Brainstem mechanisms of behav-
ior. new york: wiley & sons.
Kobayashi,  A.,  yamagiwa,  h.,  hoshino,  h.,  Muto,  A.,  sato,  K., 
Morita, M., et al. (2000). A combinatorial code for gene ex-
pression generated by transcription factor Bach2 and MAZr 
(MAZ-related factors) through the BtB/PoZ domain. Molecular 
Cellular Biology, 20(5),1733-1746.
Koch,  c.  (2004).  The  quest  for  consciousness.  englewood,  co: 
roberts and company.
Kuhl, P., & rivera-gaxiola, M. (2008). neural substrates of language 
acquisition. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 31, 511-534.
ledoux, J. (2002). Synaptic self: How our brains become who we 
are. new york: viking.
Macdonald, K. d., Fifkova, e., Jones, M. s., & Barth, d. s. (1998). Focal 
stimulation of the thalamic reticular nucleus induces focal gam-
ma waves in cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 79, 474-477.
Masquelier, t.,  hugues,  e.,  gustavo,  d.,  & thorpe,  J.  s.  (2009). 
oscillations,  phase-of-firing  coding,  and  spike  timing-de-
pendent  plasticity:  An  efficient  learning  scheme.  Journal of  
Neuroscience, 29(43), 13484-13493.
Murthy, v. n., & Fetz, e. (1996). synchronization of neurons dur-
ing local field potential oscillations in sensorimotor cortex of 
awake monkeys. Journal of Neurophysiology, 76, 3968-3982.
nunez, P. (2010). Brain, mind, and the structure of reality. new york: 
oxford University Press. 
osborne, l. c., Palmer, s. e., lisberger, s. g., & Bialek, w. (2008). the 
neural basis for combinatorial coding in a cortical population 
response. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(50), 13522-13531.
Pesaran, B., Pezaris, J. s., sahani, M., Mitra, P. P., & Andersen, r. A. 
(2002). temporal structure in neuronal activity during working 
memory in macaque parietal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 
805-811.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2011 • volume 7 • 16-30 30
reich, d. s., Mechler, F., & victor, J. d. (2001). independent and 
redundant  information  in  nearby  cortical  neurons.  Science, 
294, 2566-2568.
rutishauser, U., ross, i. B., Mamelak, A. n., & schuman, e. M.(2010). 
human  memory  strength  is  predicted  by  theta-frequency 
phase locking of single neuron. Nature, 464, 903-907.
schiff, n. d. (2008). central thalamic contributions to arousal reg-
ulation and neurological disorders of consciousness. Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, 1129, 105-118.
schulz,  r.,  lüders,  h.  o.,  noachtar,  s.,  May,  t.,  sakamoto,  A.,    
holthausen, h., & wolf, P. (1995). Amnesia of the epileptic aura. 
Neurology, 45(2), 231-235.
shadlen, M. n., & Movshon, J. A. (1999). synchrony unbound: A 
critical evaluation of the temporal binding hypothesis. Neuron, 
24, 67-77.
singer, w. (2001). consciousness and the binding problem. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 929, 123-146.
stapp, h. (2007). Mindful universe: Quantum mechanics and the 
participating observer. new york: springer-verlag. 
steriade, M. (2006). grouping of brain rhythms in corticothalamic 
systems. Neuroscience, 137, 1087-1106.
steriade, M., & Mccarley, r. w. (2005). Brain control of wakefulness 
and sleep (2nd ed.). new york: springer.
steriade, M., & glenn, l. l. (1982). neocortical and caudate projec-
tions of intralaminar thalamic neurons and their synaptic exci-
tation from midbrain reticular core. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
48, 352-371.
tolman, e. c. (1932). Purposive behavior in animals and men. new 
york: century.
walsh, v., & Pascual-leone, A. (2003). Transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation. cambridge, MA: Mit Press.
yingling, c. d., & skinner, J. e. (1977). gating of thalamic input to 
cerebral cortex by nucleus reticularis thalami. in J. e. desmedt 
(ed.), Attention, voluntary contraction, and event-related cerebral 
potentials (vol. 1, pp. 70-96). Basel, new york:  Karger.
received 10.11.2010   |   AccePted 25.03.2011